MARCELIAN CONCEPT OF TRUTH
What do we mean when we state that we are guided by a love of truth, or that someone has sacrificed himself for to 'the Truth'? These assertions are void of meaning if truth be defined as ' veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus (truth is the adequation of the thing and the intellect)'; they make sense only if truth become a stake to be striven for. There would be no meaning in saying that somebody had died for the adequation of the thing and the intellect.
Marcel tries to ask saying is there any difference between what the truth is and what simply is? Is not obvious that what is true is nothing other than what is, what exists, what is the case; from a certain point of view, the difference between them is non-existent. But only from a certain point of view and more precisely from the perspective of a kind of thinking turned at once towards the object and towards possible action on the object, that is to say thinking along the lines of technique.
According to Marcel, truth is only a single aspect of reality, and is not the whole of reality. Truth may emerge from reality, but reality is more than truth. The fulfillment of truth, or the totality of all truths, may produce an inclusive reality. The universe may realize itself in the fulfillment of truth. However, the universe may also include things which are lacking in truth. Truth is both immanent and transcendent.
Marcel argues that truth is a value or ideal which we may strive for. Feelings may be different from logical propositions in that feelings may be neither true nor false. Judgments of value may be either true or false, but we may not be able to describe a sensation or feeling as either true or false.1
Marcel argues that feeling is not merely a passive function which is made possible by sensory capability. Feeling is also a mode of active participation in the world. Active participation may be either objective or non-objective. Non-objective participation may include subjective participation. However, non-objective participation may also include intersubjective participation. Intersubjectivity (or shared subjectivity) may bring unity to our being in the world.
Marcel emphasizes that feeling is not passive, and that feeling is participation. However, participation is more than feeling. Participation is active engagement in the world.
According to Marcel, each person may have both an objective identity in the outer world and a subjective identity in the inner world of his or her own thoughts or feelings. A person's subjective identity may be a felt quality of identity which may change in accordance with changes in that person's feelings. A felt quality (or a quality of feeling) may be unanalyzable, because the quality of a person's feelings may be inseparable from the things which that person feels. A felt quality may be a unity of feeling which cannot be dissolved by primary reflection.
Marcel describes contemplation as a mode of active perception which transcends the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Contemplation is a mode of observation which transcends the difference between the inner world and the outer world. Contemplation is also a mode of participation in the being of whatever is contemplated. Contemplation is an inward regrouping or 'ingathering' of mental resources. To contemplate is to gather one's mental resources in the presence of whatever is being contemplated.
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